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# Intelligence Report

*Peking's Support of Insurgencies  
In Southeast Asia*

(Reference Title: **POLO LIII**)

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
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April 1973

RSS No. 0065/73

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## PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study establishes the facts and examines the purposes of China's support of insurgencies in Southeast Asia.

It is a fact that, despite China's overall policy of friendly relations, and despite the passage of some four years since the general ending of Cultural Revolution militancy, China continues to sponsor and support insurgencies against certain governments in Southeast Asia.

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These remote insurgencies are not likely to threaten the Rangoon or Bangkok governments, but the fact remains that China's covert sponsorship of these insurrections is clearly impeding China's diplomatic attempts to elicit further responsiveness from these same governments.

This study examines various possible purposes behind this self-defeating course -- "two faced," as the Burmese call it. Is the Chinese purpose essentially

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that of attempting to exert added pressure on certain of China's small neighbors? Or a concern not to be up-staged by any new Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and in the support of revolutionary movements? Or an unwillingness or inability to cease supporting insurgencies once begun? Or bureaucratic disarray in the conduct of Chinese foreign relations? Or, a reflection of Maoist impulses? The study concludes that it is the latter of these purposes which carries the greatest force: China supports certain insurgencies in Southeast Asia largely because that's the way the boss, Mao Tse-tung, wants it -- for his own mix of stubbornly-held ideological and personal reasons.

This study has received constructive assistance from a number of CIA offices. The study's interpretations are those of its author [Redacted] and of this Staff.

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Hal Ford  
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

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## PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

### Summary

Peking has a two-level foreign policy with respect to certain governments in Southeast Asia: ostensibly friendly diplomacy on one level; and insurgency-support on another -- most notably in Burma and Thailand, to a lesser extent in Malaysia and the Philippines. The explanation for this anomaly is to be found mainly in the ideological and personal predilections of Mao Tse-tung, who still has such authority in the PRC that he can and does require the continuation of one policy, insurgency-support, which impedes Chinese progress in its overall diplomatic efforts.

The policy of insurgency-support does not seem to be essentially a device for exerting pressure on nearby governments, the stick of a rationally-conceived carrot-and-stick approach. Burma, for example, gives the Chinese leaders no cause for applying pressure: it is non-aligned, it has paid reparations to Peking for the damages of the mid-1967 anti-Chinese riots, and it has exchanged ambassadors with the PRC. Nonetheless, China is not only supporting but sponsoring the northeast insurgency, and the results are now detrimental to Peking's diplomatic interests -- so much so that Prime Minister Ne Win is being forced out of his quiet isolationist policy into an active search for a common front against Peking, including a possible detente with Thailand. For its part, Thailand does give the Chinese leaders cause for applying pressure in order to eliminate the US military presence there,

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but Peking has not indicated that insurgency-support would end if that cause were to be removed: the Chinese-run operational radio, Voice of the People of Thailand, broadcasting from south China, continues to attack the US military presence in Thailand but has never suggested that the insurgents might settle with Bangkok if that presence were removed.

Nor does insurgency-support seem intended to prevent the Soviets from filling the "vacuum" left by US withdrawals from the area. Nearby countries have their own inclinations and reasons for avoiding a request for a Soviet presence. Ironically, if anything might work to frighten nearby countries, providing for them a reason to turn to the Soviets for concrete military aid, it would be the heightening of Chinese insurgency-support.

Similarly, the Chinese do not appear to be supporting these insurgencies in order to demonstrate to radicals, world-wide, that they are more revolutionary than the Soviets. The evidence is that the Chinese have shown no particular concern with their image among radicals in recent years: for example, China disparaged the revolutionary actions of rebels in Ceylon and Bangladesh in 1971; and the Chinese opened themselves to charges within the world Communist movement of "opportunistic betrayal" in July 1971 when they quickly moved to strengthen relations with the new government in the Sudan, which had arrested large numbers of Communists.

Neither does insurgency-support seem to have been continued (and even somewhat increased in the cases of Burma and Thailand) because of momentum, or "bureaucratic lag." Mao surely has the authority to end insurgency-support if he so desired. He demonstrated his ability to turn policy around completely with respect to relations with the US. He

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also changed from encouraging Hanoi to "protract" its effort against South Vietnam to accepting the cease-fire arrangements. It would be far less difficult for him to knock off covert support of small-scale insurrection in nearby countries.

Chou En-lai has apparently had to comply with Mao's wishes in this respect. He has explicitly endorsed continuation of insurgency-support. So far as can be observed and judged, Chou has never, since Mao came to dominate the Chinese leadership in 1935, opposed Mao's will, once Mao had made clear what policy he wanted carried out. Chou's survival suggests not that he is more subtle in thwarting Mao's preferences than other Chinese leaders purged in recent years, but that he has never tried to deceive Mao. His style of work seems to have been, and still to be, that of using persuasion at a time when Mao is open to persuasion. Chou apparently has been permitted by Mao to subordinate revolution-support to PRC diplomatic needs in several cases outside Southeast Asia, Ethiopia and Zaire being notable examples. But he has apparently had to comply with Mao's abiding view on support for the nearby insurgencies.

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The Chinese themselves for the first time admitted (in March 1973) that sustained Chinese aid would include "manpower" inputs into Burma. Additional support is present in the form of material aid: this has included modern weapons and supplies, as well as the extensive use of a PLA hospital near the Burma and Thailand border.

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This policy indicates that when faced with the concrete, specific choice of either priority to diplomacy or priority to insurgency-support, the

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Chinese leaders thus far are continuing to give priority to the latter in dealing with these countries.

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In Malaysia, Peking's support of the 1,800 insurgents does not include direct inputs of personnel or weapons, for obvious logistical reasons. This handicap is also operative in Peking's support of the 1,000 Maoist insurgents in the Philippines. The Communist leadership of both these insurgencies is loyal to Peking on an entire range of issues and is pledged to fight a long, Mao-model war against the government. The Chinese-run operational radio, Voice of the Malayan Revolution, broadcasts regularly from South China to insurgents in Malaysia, calling for an expansion of their armed struggle. There is no sign that these broadcasts will be discontinued in the near future.

Southeast Asian leaders believe the single most important obstacle to establishing diplomatic relations with Peking is this insurgency-support. Peking's policy strengthens the argument against establishing relations by those men within the respective country leaderships who desire a go-slow approach; it weakens the argument of those who advocate early recognition. Undoubtedly, Chou En-lai is fully informed of this impediment to new diplomatic successes, and sees the irrationality of it.

The main reason for the continuation of Peking's self-defeating policy to support insurgencies nearby seems clearly to be Mao's ideological and personal desire to prove that Mao-model armed struggles can be born and survive. On a deeper, perhaps even unconscious, level he may want to prove this to himself -- as well as to the scoffing Soviets, who have disputed this point with him for over a decade. Mao still insists that armed struggle is the only road to national power for Communists. This dogma in Mao's thinking apparently is not as firmly rooted

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in Chou's thinking. As with Stalin, it will probably prove to be the case that after the dominant leader is dead certain of the old leader's obsessions -- including, in the Chinese case, support of insurgencies -- will be exposed for what they are, irrational concepts impeding policy, and will then be marked for discard.

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PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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## PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

## IDEOLOGY: THE UNSHAKEN FOUNDATION

Since Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution in 1967, and earlier in the case of Thailand, Peking has been playing a major role in stimulating the revival of floundering insurgencies in several Southeast Asian countries. The armed insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines virtually had collapsed in the 1950's and in effect, had been abandoned by Peking for purposes of diplomacy. This policy of disengagement was reversed in the case of Thailand in 1965, and in the cases of Burma, Malaysia, and the Philippines in 1967. The new policy of political stimulation and various kinds of material support stems basically from the ideological and personal inclinations of Mao which had been touched off by a punishment motive but which are not now sustained by that motive.

The Source of Insurgency Revival


The thrust -- that is, the initial propulsion -- for revival of the insurgencies came from Peking rather than from the guerrillas who were hiding in the jungles.

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
## SOUTHEAST ASIA: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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
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The policy of deliberate stimulation included an entire range of methods of practical support. One of the material inputs which required a Chinese leadership decision was the diplomatically sensitive one of supplying Chinese-made weapons. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, it had been Chinese practice to avoid such a policy of supply, inasmuch as captured Chinese-made weapons would be concrete evidence of PRC interference in revolution beyond its borders. But in 1967, Mao apparently decided to change this cautious and prudent policy.



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Evidence later revealed (for the first time in 1969), that the Thai insurgents were being supplied with clearly identified Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles. The insurgents in Burma were also shown to have been receiving easily identifiable Chinese-made weapons. That this was deliberate Chinese policy, rather than a policy the North Vietnamese on their own were

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practicing from caches in Laos, is indicated by the statement of Politburo member Kang Sheng.

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The shift from a policy of disengagement to one of deliberate stimulation and support was accompanied by Chinese insistence to the insurgents that the guerrilla war must be well-organized in order to make positive gains. At an early date, the Chinese began to show their pleasure with the new and serious way the insurgents were prosecuting the small war. For example, speaking to an "activist congress" in Shanghai on 4 April 1968, Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao said that "In Burma, guerrilla warfare has made faster progress in one year than in the past 20 years." The three clandestine radio stations beaming broadcasts into the nearby insurgencies from China for several years have noted the improvement in organization, commitment, and fighting tactics of the insurgents Peking supports. The contrast with the poor showing of the 1950's is striking.

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The Incongruous Mix in Southeast Asia

Peking's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia is strikingly marked by a dual approach. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is simultaneously trying to improve relations with countries in the area while the CCP is supporting insurrections -- and helping to expand them -- within these countries. Both policies are going forward at the same time. Diplomacy toward Burma, Thailand, Malaysia (including North Borneo), and the Philippines is not displacing insurgency-support. Insurgency-support is not displacing diplomacy. By contrast, policy toward Africa (other than PRC support of insurgencies against colonial or white governments) and Latin America reveals a clear-cut displacement of insurgency-support by diplomacy. In the Middle East, PRC support of Arab insurgency against Israel primarily aids national self-interest rather than revolutionary interest. Only in Southeast Asia is the PRC policy equally and inharmoniously mixed.

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This is further evidence that PRC diplomacy must work within revolutionary limits. PRC Foreign Ministry officials (and Chou En-lai) have a warrant to "adopt a flexible attitude" to improve government-to-government relations "even if a country previously adopted a policy hostile to China" (as a joint editorial of 1 October 1972 put it). But they have no warrant, even in private talks, to promise an end to insurgency-support in Southeast Asia.

Chou, and Foreign Ministry officials working for him, apparently are operating under an overall guideline of Mao's. This guideline requires that they maintain for Southeast Asia a two-level policy, clearly duplicitous in the view of leaders in nearby countries,

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
and duplicitic in the Chinese leaders' own perception of it. There is evidence that the two-level policy is a deliberate and planned course of action, rather than a dying remnant of a policy Mao retains reluctantly. In capsule form, the policy requires that Chou work for improved relations with Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines but not at the expense of ceasing support of the insurgencies in these four countries.

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### Radio Peking and the Clandestine Radios

The Chinese seem to recognize that their image with the Western powers and Japan requires a concealment of the extent of PRC support of insurgency. This fact is reflected most clearly in Chou's well-documented actions to differentiate government from party support, and open from covert support.

Radio Peking, which beams broadcasts to a wide range of international audiences, has reduced its coverage of nearby insurgency developments. This has taken place, step-by-step, since the fall of 1970 in the case of Burma, and since mid-1971 in the cases of Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Recourse to a similar low-profile, or disengagement from open support, has been the policy also with the PRC central press. Radio Peking and the central press now only rarely initiate a commentary on the nearby insurgencies. The practice has become one of rebroadcasting or

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reprinting either an item from one of the clandestine radios in south China or from foreign news sources.

The three clandestine radios, broadcasting from complexes in China -- two from Yunnan and one from Hunan -- continue to beam native language programs regularly to the insurgents in Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. Programs detailing aspects of the insurgency in the Philippines are carried by the radio handling Malaysian guerrilla developments. The broadcasts range in content from guidance and indoctrination programs to highly abusive attacks on the leaders of nearby governments in the area. The attacks are more abusive than those Radio Peking had carried, except for a period in 1967 at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolution. They are a source of concern to leaders of nearby governments, and they are one of the concrete Chinese practices which has slowed down the progress of PRC diplomacy in the area.

Aside from the emphasis in the broadcasts on how to make the insurgencies work, the radio programs are conceived on the assumption that the men in the field are under a strong study discipline. On occasion, the assumption seems to be that they are under roughly the same study discipline as CCP mainland cadres. For example, in May 1972, the text of one of Mao's essays was broadcast to insurgent cadres in Malaysia by the broadcasts of the clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR). On other occasions, the complete text of PRC statements are broadcast, obviously for study and memorization.

There is considerable evidence that Chou En-lai is the most important official implementing the transparent device of separating state-to-state from party-to-party relations. Chou's personal activities began in the spring of 1971, included the visit of Ne Win in August 1971, and appeared openly as a basic policy in October 1971, when Peking started to hold separate

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National Day receptions for foreign diplomats and foreign Communists.

The number of greeting messages, connected with various Chinese anniversary dates and attributed to Communist parties engaged in the nearby insurgencies, has been reduced in Radio Peking and central press coverage. These messages are handled by the clandestine radios assigned to each insurgency. Messages of greetings from one Communist Party to another are also assigned to the clandestine radios, a recent example being the message from the Burmese Communists to the Thai Communists on 30 November 1972, commanding the Thais for fighting against the "traitorous Thanom-Praphat clique" and for "following the teaching of great Chairman Mao Tse-tung that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The broadcast stated that the Burmese Communists are following the same Mao-model policy.

#### The Retreat from Ideological Rigidity Elsewhere

Beyond Southeast Asia, Chinese spokesmen have a less restricted scope which permits them in private talks to promise to cease supporting uprisings within other countries. They are able effectively to avoid risking damage to PRC diplomacy; they need not accept a slowdown in its advance by rigidly supporting insurrections or sudden coups.

#### Africa and the Middle East

A clear indication that the Chinese are aware of the incongruity of revolution and diplomacy is found in the way they have downgraded insurgency-support (except in cases of colonial or white regimes) when

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they desire a rapid advance of government-to-government relations. In order to let diplomacy take command, they have begun to say that China cannot support insurrection in Africa because there is no potential there for it.

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In the Middle East, Chinese diplomacy requires PRC support of a certain guerrilla war -- that is, the one Arab fedayeen are trying to wage against Israel. The Arab guerrillas are not ideological allies. They are not Communists, and they are not likely to establish a Communist regime, or a viable base area, or even a Communist Party organization. The ideological element here is dominated by the practical one of PRC diplomacy toward Arab governments, even though in this case Peking is openly supporting "armed struggle."

### Latin America

In Latin America also diplomacy has taken command. The main thrust of policy is to avoid revolutionary statements and to stress government-to-government relations. One exception will be discussed later.

China intends to be very cautious when it comes to supporting armed revolts and guerrilla movements in Latin America.

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the PRC does not intend to jeopardize current prospects for diplomatic gains by ill-conceived support of revolutionary movements they really know nothing about. (Actually, in Latin America as in Africa, the Chinese are now unwilling to support guerrilla wars

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about which they know a great deal.) This policy of disengagement was more fully elaborated on 25 August 1971 by Keng Piao, Director of the International Liaison Department, CCP. Keng told [redacted]

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[redacted] that China would support only "organized" pro-Peking Communist parties, presumably only those which were unfractured and amenable to CCP guidance. Keng said that China would not become involved with adventurous movements like the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the rebel armed forces in Guatemala, and (obviously) "Che" Guevara's men.

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Chou En-lai was to put the policy into practice. Following Peru's recognition of the PRC (2 November 1971), the Chinese desired a further improvement of government-to-government relations. When, therefore, a visiting cabinet minister of Peru asked Chou, in mid-January 1972, why pro-Peking parties in Peru were allowed to continue to attack the Lima government as a "fascist regime" when, supposedly, good relations existed between the two governments, Chou reacted against the revolutionaries. He angrily condemned the action of these groups. He said that no party in Peru had ever received official authorization to include "China" in its party name or to assume that it represented the Chinese people or the CCP. By contrast, in Southeast Asia, the China-based clandestine radios continue to disparage certain nearby governments as "fascist regimes."

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The Durability of Ideology: "Armed Struggle"

In Latin American policy, there is at least one exception of considerable significance. That is, there is an instance in which an ideological concept was defended -- openly and deliberately -- in a way not conducive to PRC diplomatic progress. It was defended by the man with the most diplomatic sense in the Chinese leadership: Chou En-lai. The instance is yet another confirmation that certain elements -- indestructable core elements -- still exist in Mao's thinking. In this case, the core element was Mao's view that the only way to permanent national power for revolutionaries is by way of "armed struggle."

In early September 1971, one year after Allende's electoral victory in Chile, in an interview with a Mexican editor in Peking, Chou was asked about the CCP's position that national power must be seized only by "armed force." He was asked how he viewed the parliamentary road -- the path of elections Allende had taken. Chou's response was along rigid ideological lines. He chose not to be diplomatic; that is, he did not equivocate and did not avoid disparaging Allende's election route to power. He chose a critical tack despite the fact that Allende's government had shown goodwill: it had cut ties with Taipei and granted formal recognition to Peking on 5 January 1971. This action had provided Peking with an important breakthrough in government relations in Latin America.

Chou proceeded to give an analysis for worldwide publication which was similar to that of doctrinal extremists in Chile and not flattering to

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Allende. Disregarding the fact that Allende had attained decisive political support before the assassination of General Schneider, Chou insisted that "what most helped Salvador Allende, the truly decisive factor, was a counter-revolutionary bullet, an assassin's bullet, which killed General Schneider... therefore, the majority vote went to Allende." Chou made the point explicitly that:

*We do not believe in struggle by  
the parliamentary method.*

He described Allende's victory in unflattering terms as a "transitory phenomenon" which could be lost, and Allende as having won the "government but not the power" because he did not control the army, which later could be used against him. Pro-Soviet Communists in Chile immediately attacked. Chou for this example of ideological gaucherie, and Allende himself undoubtedly was angered by it.

This exceptional behavior is a case of ideology taking precedence over diplomatic tact. The fact that Mao holds tenaciously to certain ideological positions because of doctrinal and personal predilection -- and holds them ever more tenaciously because the Soviets continue to oppose them -- is the fundamental reason why doctrine displaced diplomatic prudence in the case of Allende's victory.

Allende's victory had been portrayed by various Communists in the international movement as a valid demonstration that Mao was wrong about "armed struggle" being the only road to national power. Peking's defense of Mao's ideological position had been set forth at

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great length, with great heat, and with great publicity in the joint editorial in Peking's central press on 17 March 1971.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung...points out:  
'According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army.'

Violent revolution is the universal principle of proletarian revolution... and there is no exception...

In the past decades, many Communist parties have participated in elections and parliaments, but none has set up a dictatorship of the proletariat by such means. Even if a Communist party should win a majority in parliament or participate in the government, this would not mean any change in the character of bourgeois political power, still less in the smashing of the old state machine...

The proletariat must use the gun to seize political power and must use the gun to defend it... (emphasis supplied)

An analysis of Chou's early September 1971 interview strongly suggests that he was repeating the ideological position of the abovementioned March 1971 joint editorial. Prior to Allende's electoral victory, Peking

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had been supporting a more radical group of Chilean Communists against the pro-Moscow local Communists. In July 1970, Politburo member Kang Sheng had made a special point of praising the pro-Chinese Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile precisely because it held the line of taking power only through "armed struggle," as opposed to the "revisionist line of the Soviet clique." Allende's popular-vote victory was a direct refutation of Mao's dogmatic view. But in early September 1971, Chou had to comply with Mao's ideological position, and he had to do so publicly. In trying to demonstrate that somehow "armed struggle" had aided Allende -- "an assassin's bullet" -- and that Allende might not be able to consolidate his victory because he did not control the army, Chou was being abrasive, making statements contrary to what would have benefited PRC national interests in Santiago.

The ideological view that national power must be seized along the road of "armed struggle" rather than along the parliamentary road cuts across the grain of a foreign policy of flexibility. It could impede progress in diplomacy toward democracies which already have recognized the PRC as China's only legal government, or which are being encouraged to grant such recognition. There is some evidence that Chou is aware of this and may want to dilute the doctrine in certain cases. He may be seeking Mao's permission to be more selective about defending the "armed struggle" concept outside of the insurgencies in Southeast Asia which the PRC supports.

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the more rigid formula is the view that officially prevails. The Peking central press has published excerpts of an article written by the Central Committee of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Brazil which included the statement that the Brazilian people's

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"road of armed struggle" is "the only road possible" for revolutionary victory. (Peking, NCNA, 17 February 1972)

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### The Durability of Chinese Insurgency-Support

The ideological position that "armed struggle," rather than the parliamentary road, is the only road to power is being sustained in Chinese comment on the insurgencies they support. It appears on occasion in the central press. All three clandestine radios continue to beam this fixed position into Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia. These insurgencies, and the one Peking helps to inspire in the Philippines, comprise the clearest example, in Mao's apparent view, that he is right and the Soviet leaders are wrong in the fervently contested view that guerrilla wars, not

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elections, are the best way to seize national power. The Chinese are telling their client insurgents in the field that even Stalin had denounced the parliamentary road. The Chinese-operated VMR, between 20 and 26 September 1972, beamed broadcasts into Malaysia containing the first half of Stalin's work, Foundations of Leninism, in which Stalin criticized the parties of the Second International for being subservient to the parliamentary road. This is the ideological position with which cadres in the insurgencies must comply.

This is Mao's ideological core position, with which Chou must comply. Thus far, it seems to be impervious to change despite the shift to flexibility in foreign policy. The end of the war in Vietnam, therefore, will probably not lead to an end of Chinese insurgency-support. It probably will continue at least until Mao dies.

It is the basic assumption of this paper that Mao dominates the Chinese leaders in making major policy decisions. He dominates, for example, his wife and Chou. So far as can be observed and judged, Chou has never, since Mao came to dominate the Chinese

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leadership in 1935, opposed Mao's will, once Mao had made it clear what he wanted carried out in policy. Chou's survival suggests not that he is more subtle in thwarting Mao's preferences than other Chinese leaders (who are now political corpses), but that he has never tried to deceive Mao. His style of work seems to have been, and still to be, that of using persuasion at a time when Mao is open to persuasion. The 1969 firefights on the Sino-Soviet border and Soviet verbal threats provided Chou with a great opportunity to persuade Mao convincingly of the benefits (and need) of a foreign policy of flexible maneuver. Chou's conjectured persuasion of Mao included an effort to make Mao see the wisdom of restricting Chinese support of insurgencies outside Southeast Asia (with certain exceptions).

Chou has been permitted by Mao to have his way in subordinating revolution-support to PRC diplomatic needs in several cases outside Southeast Asia. He and other Chinese officials have criticized "Che" Guevara, the Tupamaros, pro-Peking Communists in Peru, and the Ceylonese short-term insurgents. Chou, on the evidence, seems to have had a lower opinion of foreign insurgents as worthwhile clients than Mao has had. This difference in appraisal almost certainly exists today, especially regarding some nearby states.

While Mao now permits Chou to end insurgency-support elsewhere, his abiding view apparently is to sustain support for those which are gradually expanding in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Chou clearly must comply with this abiding view.

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Within the framework of interpretation which sees Maoist ideology -- Mao's personal "thought" -- as the main reason for sustained insurgency-support, this support is being provided in a sensible way. The Chinese are making small inputs gradually, rather than big inputs at priority speed, into the insurgencies in Burma and Thailand. The ideologically-motivated policy is being carried out only in certain countries where it is feasible for the Chinese to guide it. The capability to guide and influence -- this is the first requirement for Chinese support. Provided that such a capability is at hand, certain other criteria determine the Chinese policy. First, the Chinese must control the insurgency directly with their own cadres, or through pro-Chinese cadres in the insurgent ranks. Second, proximity to the borders of China determines, to some degree, the capability the Chinese have in guiding an insurgency. Third, the insurgency must be viable to begin with, or open to a Chinese role in making it viable. The insurgency must be amenable to Chinese guidance on organizational work, ideological commitment, and military integrity.

Mao apparently does not seem deterred from sponsoring or supporting these insurgencies in South-east Asia by the probability that they will not spread from the periphery to the vital center of the countries where they are developing. It seems to be more important at present to him that they exist than that they are made to expand rapidly and extensively. Mao apparently believes that withdrawing Peking's support (and thereby risking the collapse of some of them) would give the Soviet leaders a big ideological victory in the dispute over "armed struggle." The anti-Soviet animus in his thinking may buttress his own ideological predilection to sustain insurgency-support.

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The importance of the ideological motivation, the persistence of dogma in Mao's thinking, seems to be far greater than in Chou's thinking. Moreover, Chou has no pretensions to doctrinal creativity. As with Stalin, it will probably prove to be the case that only after the dominant leader is dead that certain detrimental obsessions with ideology will be exposed for what they are, irrational concepts impeding policy, and will then be marked for discard.

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PEKING'S PRIMARY ROLE IN THE INSURGENCIES

Burma

China is the main propelling force in the expanding insurgency in Burma's northeast.

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The need to send across the border such an impressive array of PLA personnel is a measure of how badly the Communist insurgency had floundered prior to 1967 when operating on its own, and of how badly it might deteriorate if Peking were to withdraw its thoroughgoing sponsorship.

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


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
The insurgency is not controlled by local Burmese Communists. Specifically, it is not controlled by the Chairman of the Burma Communist Party -- the BCP (White Flag), led by Chairman Thakin Zin. He is operating farther south, in the Pegu Yoma mountains, with a small remnant force which is euphemistically touted as the "Central Command." It is still an ineffective remnant of the pre-1967 Burmese Communist forces; [redacted]

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## BURMA: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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Theoretically, Chairman Thakin Zin is responsible for making policy decisions, and as recent as 20 August 1972, the PRC-run clandestine radio station beamed his "instructions" to Burma insurgents. In practice, however, he and his group of followers defer to the instructions from the Northeast Command on all key issues.

Compared to the small gains in territory made by the end of 1969, the land the insurgents now hold in the northeast shows a course of expansion rather than contraction. China's input also is growing. Everything the Chinese diplomats have done on the level of government-to-government relations with Rangoon and Ne Win has not changed the fact that Peking covertly is sponsoring this expansion by continuing to train tribal insurgents in China and by sending in men, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies.

As a result of the Chinese input of special PLA personnel, and also because of intensive organizational work conducted among the tribal peoples, the insurgency in the northeast is now the most effective one that Rangoon has ever had to grapple with. The professional political and organizational work of the Chinese which raises the level of discipline and competence has also been urged upon insurgent forces in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines by Peking. As a result, these forces are no longer ineffectual roving bands of "only-military" (Guevaraist-type) guerrillas, as they had been prior to 1967. All this points beyond mere rhetoric, mere token support, and mere gesture to a serious, professional policy intended, on the practical level, to make certain insurrections in Southeast Asia take hold and gradually expand along the road of "protracted war."

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The Burma case shows more clearly than any other case the existence of a motivation in addition to, or more important and durable than, the more rational one of punishment. In the summer of 1967, Mao acted to punish Ne Win for the anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon, and the method he used was to revive the insurgency in the northeast. But Ne Win has agreed to reparations and the grudge Mao has held against him may no longer be the major motivation which sustains Peking's insurgency-support.

Another motivation of Mao's existed side-by-side with the punishment (or revenge-for-riots) motivation. This was his revolutionary compulsion which dominated his foreign policy thinking in 1966 and 1967. It is neither anti-Ne Win nor anti-U.S. It is an independent ideological element in Mao's political thinking. The anti-Chinese riots, in retrospect, appear to have been a triggering mechanism for directing PRC hostility toward Burma. But in 1973, revenge for the riots probably is not the major motivation for sustaining insurgency support.

In short, there are two reasons for sustaining the small war today; namely, Mao's nursing of a grudge -- in 1973 probably secondary -- and Mao's revolutionary urge to make a Mao-model insurgency work. Neither one makes good sense from the viewpoint of Peking's national interests, especially as the main thrust of those interests is to maneuver internationally around the USSR's foreign policy. This requires flexibility toward Burma as well as other states in the area.

Several alternative explanations of PRC motivation appear weak. PRC sponsorship of the Burma insurgency in the northeast does not help Hanoi in its war effort in the region. Furthermore, it leaves the new flexible diplomacy carried out by Chou En-lai open

to the risk that the Soviets might be welcomed in to supply military items by a frustrated Ne Win (or his successor), forced to turn away from China. Yet there is good evidence that Chinese diplomacy is partly directed toward keeping Soviet influence out of the area. Finally, he may seek a common front with Thailand.

Explaining the insurgency as a pressuring tool is also difficult. Territory in the mountainous tribal area of Burma's northeast does not now provide Peking with leverage to exert real pressure at the leadership level in Rangoon. Ne Win's foreign policy has not been moved by such pressure to be more anti-U.S., or to be any more "neutral" than it has been. Holding and expanding territory still is a long way from moving the tribal-based insurrection in the northeast mountains into the lowlands where the Burma people live. And in the lowlands, it would be more effectively resisted. It would provide the Burmese leaders with an easy-to-publicize international issue of a national threat -- an issue which would be injurious to Peking's foreign policy posture as a government which does not interfere in other governments' internal affairs.

Chinese diplomacy is not supplemented by it. Insurgency-support is not the stick of a carrot-and-stick policy, cleverly directed toward driving Rangoon to adopt PRC foreign policy preferences. On the contrary, the hard evidence is that PRC diplomacy is impeded by insurgency-support.

As flexible diplomacy gathered momentum, in mid-1970, NCNA articles (i.e., media commentaries which could be easily attributed to Peking as the source) were reduced in numbers and made less anti-Rangoon. But a clandestine radio station (broadcasting media commentaries which could not be as easily attributed to Peking as the source) was established (March 1971). Chou En-lai and Foreign Ministry

officials have had to take a duplicitous line -- that is, denying insurgency-support in such a way as to leave their listeners with a strong sense of Chinese insincerity, and with no pledge of an end to PRC support.

The existence of this incongruity seems to reflect Mao's desires, with which Chou must comply.

Since the mid-1950's, Chinese Communist policy toward the Burma insurgency had been to give advice but not material support to the old Burma Communist Party. In the mid-1950's also, Peking was careful not to give overt propaganda support to these Communist dissidents. Behind-the-scenes, the Chinese leaders had encouraged the BCP to come in from the countryside to negotiate with the government for a ceasefire; but they had not gone so far as to require the BCP to meet Rangoon's key demand that it turn in its weapons.

This non-support situation changed during Mao's Cultural Revolution. The triggering incident was the anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon of June 1967. In these riots, 50-80 local Chinese and one PRC aid-technician were killed. A motivation for punishment and a motivation for revolution were aroused in Mao's thinking. On 29 June 1967, Peking for the first time praised the "armed struggle" waged against the government. By early July, Peking was calling for the government's "overthrow." At the same time (July 1967) speaking in a revolutionary way, a Burmese Communist client resident in Peking denounced Liu Shao-chi for having "betrayed" the revolution in Burma -- the implication being that it would not be abandoned again.

Evidence that the Chinese had opted for a policy of material inputs (beyond intensified propaganda

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support) appeared soon afterward. In late July 1967, Chinese military officers contacted Kachin and Shan insurgents in the northeast to begin military planning. Starting in August, the Chinese began their important organizational efforts, designed to strengthen the influence of Peking and the newer BCP (White Flag) among the tribal Kachins and Shans. This political work was also necessary to regularize the activities of the insurgents, to add discipline to their fighting fervor, and to make clear an ultimate political goal. Thereafter, Chinese training and supply of the tribal insurgents in the northeast expanded. Peking supplied decisive guidance to make the new insurgency viable in the border region. The insurgency became a Chinese-sponsored guerrilla war of mainly Kachins and Shans against government troops, inasmuch as Peking had abandoned the old BCP which got nowhere in its operations in central Burma and which had appointed a new party chairman, Thakin Zin, not of Peking's choosing.

A major step was taken when the Chinese went beyond using only Burma-side nationals: they began to recruit PRC citizens (mainly tribal minorities with some Han Chinese) on the Yunnan-side for fighting in northeast Burma. By March 1968 such Yunnan-side recruitment was well underway. Rather than wait until Burma-side tribal minorities could be mustered into combat units, the Chinese, who showed every sign of being anxious to put muscle into this "people's war" in the northeast, recruited quickly on their side.

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
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Peking's public media began to play down the Chinese statements of support, reflecting a decision which probably was made in late August or early September 1970. The last NCNA initiated comment on the insurgency was broadcast on 4 September. Subsequently, NCNA has not initiated its own comment, citing instead other sources.

The source of propaganda was shifted to broadcasts of a new political instrument: The Voice of the People of Burma (VPB). It is a clandestine radio operation, broadcasting from within China, pinpointed in location to Mangshih, Yunnan and established in March 1971. Depicted to foreign audiences as the insurgents' "own" radio station, it is run by the Chinese. This shift in the overt source of propaganda, intended to conceal from innocents the fact that Peking was the ultimate source, and intended to improve the PRC international image, almost certainly reflects Chou En-lai's diplomacy-conscious thinking. Chou apparently had persuaded Mao that insurgency-support impedes diplomatic maneuvering, that such support should be given a much lower public profile, and that one way to lower the public profile would be to establish a new clandestine radio attributed to the insurgents alone. The establishment of the radio also suggests that while Mao was persuaded to act to aid PRC diplomatic requirements, he preferred a course which was only a new way to provide propaganda guidance and encouragement of the insurgency, not the total cessation

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of support. The cases of Thailand and Malaysia show a similar shift of propaganda guidance and support away from Peking's public media (particularly Radio Peking broadcasts and NCNA press articles) to the ongoing broadcasts of the clandestine radios assigned to beam programs into Thailand and Malaysia.

The new not-made-in-Peking profile was also used to pave the way for an exchange of ambassadors, with the Burmese man arriving in Peking in November 1970. When, in March 1971, the Chinese finally sent their ambassador to Rangoon, the Chinese inaugurated the new clandestine radio. But it would seem that Chinese material aid to the insurgents is a more accurate measure of Peking's attitude toward Rangoon than the state of diplomatic relations. Ever since the change in overt propaganda support in the fall of 1970, there has been no evidence of a reduction in Chinese military aid in the period.

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The Chinese leaders were not that much anxious to improve diplomatic relations with Rangoon that they would avoid criticizing Ne Win's government. On the contrary, they used the clandestine radio to mount vehement attacks on that government, and Ne Win was reported to have been extremely embarrassed by the start of the broadcasts less than one week after the arrival of the new Chinese ambassador in Rangoon (March 1971). The clandestine radio provided even stronger political support for the insurgency and more provocative attacks on Ne Win than Radio Peking had been issuing.

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Aside from the matter of whether Mao still demands an abject apology from Ne Win for the mid-1967 Rangoon anti-Chinese riots, the Burmese have moved on another issue to satisfy Peking.

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The inflexibility of the Chinese position had been made clear earlier when Ne Win attempted to use personal diplomacy with Peking. Despite wishful thinking [redacted] after Ne Win's visit to Peking (from 6-12 August 1971) to the effect that Peking would reduce its support of the insurgents, in fact the Chinese did not do so. On the contrary, they seem to have been stimulated to demonstrate their determination to sustain aid.

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despite outward appearances -- e.g., NCNA's depiction of Ne Win's talk with Mao on 7 August as "friendly" and Chou's reference to the Burmese leader on the preceding day as a "friend" -- Chinese broadcasts supporting the insurgents were not diminished. The China-based clandestine radio on 15 August not only called for Ne Win's "overthrow" but ended with the call: "Long live (BCP) Chairman Thakin Zin and Mao Tse-tung."

The Chinese not only did not close down their clandestine radio or drop their insurgency-support but they seem to have intensified this activity -- after several quiet months -- subsequent to Ne Win's personal appeals. On 12 August, the very day that Ne Win returned from China, forces of the

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Northeast Command overran Burmese counterinsurgency bases near Kunlong, a town about 60 miles northeast of Lashio and only 15 miles from the border. On 15 August, the clandestine radio in Yunnan called his visit one of several "sly tricks" to overcome his domestic problems and repeated the belligerent appeal to Burmese to unite with the BCP "to crush the reactionary Ne Win government." On 17 August, the insurgents captured Hopang, a town 10 miles east of Kunlong. In view of Chinese control over the Northeast Command's military operations, these mid-August attacks (the first since the seizure of Mengmao in May, 70 miles east of Lashio) may have been ordered by Peking partly with the purpose of reminding Ne Win of China's policy to sustain the insurgency.

Ne Win was silent for more than a month after his return. There is little doubt that during many long hours of private talks with Chou he had not succeeded in gaining an assurance that support for the insurgents would end. The Yunnan-based VPB continued to hammer at him as "the common enemy" who had to be "crushed." (VPB broadcast of 3 October 1971) It also taunted him for having tried to prevent his troops from listening to VPB broadcasts: "Even if Ne Win prohibits them, they will listen to the broadcasts..." (VPB broadcast of 7 October 1971) As for the guidance-disseminating role of the VPB, on 20 August 1972, important instructions were being beamed into Burma from the clandestine radio. On that date, the excerpts of an instructional speech (given by Chairman Thakin Zin) were relayed by the radio, stressing the need for recruitment of new party members based on a "unity-with-allies" principle. The instructions also declared the necessity to "crush" the "common enemy, the Ne Win-San Yu clique."

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In the field of actual fighting, the highest point of the insurgency in the northeast occurred after Ne Win's visit and his requests in Peking that PRC support be ended. On 20 November 1971, undoubtedly with Chinese initiative, insurgent forces attacked Kunlong and held it under siege for a month. On 5 December, the Chinese-run VPB beamed a broadcast commenting on the fighting, boasting that 60 government troops had been killed. Until this major attack -- the biggest engagement since Independence in Burma -- the insurgents had confined themselves to attacks on smaller targets.

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VPB broadcasts from Yunnan haranged Rangoon after the siege. In January 1972, deputy prime minister Brigadier General San Yu, who was head of the government during Ne Win's temporary absence in December and who had flown to Strategic Command

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
Headquarters in Lashio personally to assess the siege, was for the first time attacked by the VPB. This extension of Chinese hostility to Ne Win's probable successor was a more accurate indication of the state of Peking-Rangoon relations than the improvement of economic relations earlier in August, the dispatch of a Burmese ping pong team to Peking in November, and the Chinese request that Burma represent PRC interests in Bangladesh in December 1971.

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Armed insurgent strength in the Wa region south of Kunlong was estimated in June 1972 to be about 1,500. These units are well-armed with Chinese-made weapons. The contingents which seized Pangyang in May used mortars before the final assault.

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The fighting in the Wa area was the most intensive and extensive since the attacks on Kunlong. Insurgent successes there may have been a factor in the timing of Ne Win's decision, reported in mid-June, to seek military equipment from the Soviet Union. Rangoon is mainly interested in automatic weapons and ammunition, mortars, and artillery shells. Subsequently, Ne Win decided against seeking Soviet aid. About half of the government's military effort is directed against insurgents, primarily those supported by the PRC in the northeast.

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However, Peking is taking only superficial actions to conceal its support for the BCP (White Flag). One of these moves is the decision to keep Burmese Communist leaders away from the 31 July 1972 Army Day reception in Peking, in contrast with their attendance at the 1971 turnout. Nevertheless, on 20 August 1972, the clandestine radio broadcast instructions to the insurgents from the party leader, Thakin Zin.

Peking is expanding the insurgency -- already spaced out over six years -- at a slow pace. The intention seems to be to keep it at a low boil and to seize small amounts of land, calculating that such nibbling will not be used by Ne Win to sound an alarm among major world powers. Some of the land now seized is referred to as "liberated areas" by the insurgents in the field and their Chinese sponsors, and it is unlikely that it will be voluntarily returned to the control of government or non-Communist forces.

Prior to the ceasefire in Vietnam (January 1973) there was no indication that it would in any way affect the PRC's policy of sponsoring the insurgency in Burma. The Chinese-run VPB made it clear

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that this policy would go forward at a deliberate pace, and subsequently, as recent as 18 March 1973, the VPB called for more people in Burma to take the path of "revolution," demanding that they "oppose and fight the Ne Win-San Yu military government."

The insurgency in the northeast probably will continue to be sponsored by Peking at least until Mao dies. Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials have attributed the PRC policy directly to Mao -- as something that he desires. In the view of this author, this is the single most important factor in Peking's sponsoring role.


### Thailand

The insurgency in north and northeast Thailand is inspired and guided by Peking. When, in 1967, the more active dissident area -- the northeast -- was hard hit by Thai government forces, Peking subsequently acted to give it material aid, political resolve, and psychological sense of purpose. Peking almost certainly has the ultimate deciding voice in the strategy of insurgency in both areas, demonstrably

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
## THAILAND: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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## NORTH THAILAND Areas of Communist Insurgency



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so in the north and apparently so in the northeast. Thus within the context of overall guidance, Peking is the dominant influence among Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) leaders.

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The CPT has been under Chinese Communist control ever since it came into existence in 1926. The CPT leadership which emerged in later years did so exclusively under the tutelage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the mid-1960's there became available confirmation of this fact.

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Peking has retained the ability to exert overall guidance of the insurgency in the north and northeast because the top leaders of the CPT remain loyal to the huge parent party, the CCP. The CCP trained these leaders, promoted them, and now sustains them.

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[redacted] More importantly, there are no signs of real organizational independence, although leaders in the northeast may have some autonomy in tactical matters. There are no independent Ho Chi Minhs or Fidel Castros in the CPT. The tie between the CCP and the CPT is more than an ideological link. It is an organizational link.

The main radio station devoted to guidance and indoctrination of the CPT insurgents in the north and northeast is the Chinese-run Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT), broadcasting into Thailand from its base near Kunming, Yunnan. Radio Hanoi replays various broadcasts of the VPT, including battle reports, but the North Vietnamese do not have a separate radio station assigned to covering the insurgency.

The VPT, like the two additional clandestine radio stations broadcasting from south China, relays something more than mere propaganda. It is concrete guidance. The 1 December 1972 CPT Central Committee "statement" which it broadcast into Thailand contained explicit instructions on an entire range of concrete policies. The contents of the CPT "statement" -- identical in style, wording, and policy-position with CCP materials -- make it highly likely that it was drafted by the Chinese Communists in China and approved by the CCP leadership. The "statement" is an operational one, inasmuch as it tells insurgents in the field what they must do.

The "statement" lays it down to CPT personnel that "armed struggle" is the only way to attain national power -- the position opposed by the Soviets, and by some CPT members in previous years. The

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insurgency has "proven" that Mao's doctrine is the correct one.

*The past 30 years have proven that the revolution can never be achieved through peaceful means, a parliamentary system or a coup d'etat over a deadly enemy, armed from head to foot, which rules by a savage fascist dictatorship.*

It states that the insurgent army is set up on the Mao model as "a new-type revolutionary army, in accordance with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought;" this army has a 10-point "code of conduct" and was established with great stress on "cultivating a sense of political consciousness in our fighters." The "statement" instructs that guerrilla areas must be "transformed" into strongholds.

*Moreover, in order to strengthen these revolutionary strongholds, we must further enhance the people's revolutionary power, expand the people's armed forces -- including irregular forces, regional forces, and village fighters -- raise the political and ideological level of the people, lead the masses in solving land problems, promote economic development, improve the welfare of the people, and raise their cultural and hygienic standards. (emphasis supplied)*

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Continuing this instruction, personnel are told that "we must" construct the CPT along Maoist political, organizational, and ideological lines; all party members "must" grasp party policy, which includes Mao's prescription for inner-party struggle -- namely, "cure the sickness to help the patient, and unity-criticism-self-criticism-unity." Further instructions are that all party units "must" do a good job in recruiting new members, "must" train local cadres, "must" study ability and performance before promoting cadres, and "must" promote organizational and disciplinary principles within the party.

The "statement" sets a "main task" for the CPT. It stresses the need to "build more strongholds and strengthen them, and expand the guerrilla zone." It does not clarify the distinction between stronghold and guerrilla zone. The "statement" details the steps that "must" be undertaken by the populace in the strongholds and by all insurgent combat personnel.

*As for the people in the strongholds, they must heighten their revolutionary spirit, support the armed forces, the state power and the revolutionary war, exert utmost efforts to strengthen the strongholds, boost food production, increase political awareness, and resolutely fight to safeguard these strong bases.*

*All commanders and fighters in the people's armed forces must strive to raise their political standards, exert efforts to study the strategy*

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*and tactics of the revolutionary war,  
improve military techniques, and  
further heighten the solidarity  
between the commanding echelon and  
fighters and between the armed forces  
and the people...*

The "statement" goes well beyond the broadcasts which the VPT occasionally beams into Thailand for morale-building purposes and for informational purposes -- two types of broadcasts which in themselves are more than rhetoric or propaganda in the usual sense. It presents guidance, a concrete program which CPT cadres in the field "must" put into action.

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The CPT leadership is primarily Chinese, with only a few Thais having been promoted to key positions, and these having been trained for many years in China. This ethnic Chinese domination at the top of a Peking-controlled party apparatus helps to sustain that control. It was significant that the delegates representing the CPT at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow spoke in Chinese, not Thai.

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CPT subordination to the CCP is also apparent in the obedient and unequivocal support given to every position the CCP adopts in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The

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CPT does not display any of the independence associated with a really unsubordinated party apparatus. By contrast, the independent North Vietnamese -- leaders of the Lao Dong Party -- adopt a position of neutrality in the dispute, clearly showing unsubordinated status. CPT greetings to the CCP have none of the self-respect of Lao Dong Party greetings, but they display instead a sycophantic quality to the parent party, especially in the sustained tribute to Mao's "thought," indicating apparatus subordination.

The CPT is neither free from Peking's control nor subordinated to Hanoi's control at the top leadership level. But at the lower level, the situation has been changing.




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Top leaders of the CPT had been trained in China in the 1950's at a time when the Vietnamese Communists had no training role. Only in the mid-1960's, and afterward, were the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao allowed to help in the training of cadres.]



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Prior to 1967, the insurgency in the northeast was not well-organized and there was nothing of significance under CPT control stirring in the tribal areas of the north. The Chinese, in several steps strung out over the years, and with North Vietnamese help, moved in the direction of sponsoring a viable guerrilla war, making it more professional and efficient than anything previously in Thailand.

In mid-1962, the Chinese established a key guidance and indoctrination instrument: the VPT radio station near Kunming, Yunnan. VPT broadcasts encouraged the insurgents to begin a Mao-model "armed struggle" against local government forces.

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Peking introduced a sense of urgency into this low-boil insurgency only when larger strategic considerations confronted the Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders. The major consideration was the establishment of more U.S. air bases in Thailand to be used in support of the allied effort in Laos. (Souvanna Phouma first requested U.S. reconnaissance in May 1964, and a month later these planes were authorized to return fire. Thai pilots participated by mid-1964, manning some T-28 bombers. All this was from bases in Thailand.) Peking's attention turned to Thailand to warn the Thai leaders

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against cooperation with the U.S. against Communist forces in Laos, and then to punish the Thai leaders for not responding properly to the warning. Thus the marked increase in Peking's attention to the Thai insurgency had its beginning in a punishment motive. But, as will be shown, at the same time a revolutionary motive was present in Mao's policy thinking on supporting such insurgencies.

The Chinese acted to revive the small insurgency by directing CPT cadres in the field to expand their recruitment among non-Communist dissidents. An additional course of action was Chinese use of various anti-Bangkok Thai leaders in several "front" groups to serve as a rallying point for dissidents anywhere in Thailand.

The "front" groups were organized in Peking. In November 1965, Radio Peking and the VPT simultaneously announced the formation of the openly anti-Bangkok Thai Independence Movement (TIM). On 1 January 1966, the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) was placed alongside the TIM to serve as a possible rallying organization for anti-Bangkok dissidents. The idea was to bring together Thai elements who would agree to openly criticize the government and cooperate with Peking in building an out-of-country political entity. These "fronts," however, later proved to be ineffective. They included in their ranks Thai exiles who began to quarrel among themselves, and in 1969 they were marked for discard when the Chinese decided to stress the direct leadership role of the CPT of the insurgency. Unlike the "fronts," the CPT was a disciplined and obedient instrument of Peking's policy.

The course taken to expand the insurgency can be traced back to September 1964, although low-boil training of guerrilla fighters had taken place in

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previous years.

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
On 8 December 1964, Radio Peking for  
the first time called for the "overthrow" of the Bangkok  
government.

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
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The year 1965 included not only a top-level Chinese decision to beef up the Thailand insurgency but also implementation of that decision in the form of training and strategic planning.


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In the field in the northeast, it was not until 1966 that the CPT-led insurgents shifted their tactics from avoiding contact with Thai armed forces to a military campaign directed against local police forces. By the end of 1966, the insurgents had inflicted about 50 casualties on Thai government personnel. But the

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guerrillas were handed a major defeat in 1967. In February and August, Thai security forces captured key Communist guerrillas in the northeast, virtually destroying the insurgency there for several years.

The Chinese shifted their attention in 1967 from the ruins of the guerrilla effort in the northeast to the north. In the north, the Chinese saw greater assets and potential. The insurgents were mostly tribal (Meo), and they were better fighters. The rugged mountains provided safer sanctuary; and supply lines from China through Laos were shorter. The CPT was to recruit among them.

Meo people in the north had been trained, on a small scale, in North Vietnam and China prior to 1967. But in that year, the effort may have been stepped up.

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The Chinese have placed a very strong emphasis on the need for insurgents to be totally indoctrinated and organizationally well-disciplined. The idea of insurgents "gradually raising their political consciousness and sense of organization" in order to make a revolution succeed (Peking People's Daily, Red Flag, Liberation Army Daily joint editorial of 1 October 1972) is considered by the Chinese one of the clear differences between Mao's road and Guevara's "purely military" road. The imposition of this idea on the practical activities of the CPT recruiters and

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organizers in the north and northeast has helped give the insurgencies there the firm foundation of discipline needed to make a revolution advance. Political commitment undoubtedly was stressed in the course of training of Meo and Yao tribesmen

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The shift to the Meo insurgents in the north was also reflected in Peking's indoctrination and guidance instruments. Starting in the summer of 1968, Radio Peking and the VPT began carrying Meo-language broadcasts to the tribal fighters. The content was inflammatory and clearly intended to turn the Meos decisively against the government. (Fighting between the Meos and government forces had already broken out in the north in early 1968; more seriously, an insurgent unit had attacked the town of Chon Daen in the tri-province area farther south in November 1968.) In September 1968, greatly intensified broadcasting from China became a regular feature of Chinese support and guidance. The theme was oppression of the Meo people. The theme has been carried through to the present time. An example of Peking's indoctrination and stimulation effort follows:

*The US-Thanom clique has constantly looked down upon the Meo people.... The Meo tribesmen have earned their living for generations without the help of an oppressive administration... the CPT is leading the people to rise and stage a revolution...the Meo people have no alternative...than to take arms and fight against it... (Yunnan-based VPT broadcast of 30 August 1969) (Emphasis supplied)*

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These broadcasts are also beamed in to help the insurgents in their recruitment effort. For example, the contents of a leaflet mailed to a "village volunteer" member in south Thailand on 26 June 1972 used themes which appear in VPT broadcasts: the goal of the insurgency is to "overthrow" the government, there is only one party -- the CPT -- and there is "no foreigner in the CPT," the small war is expanding and the government cannot "suppress us," every day the people "give more support to the TPIAF," and "you should turn the barrel of your gun on the US-Thanom-Praphat regime which is the enemy of the people."

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In parallel with their stress on political commitment, the Chinese placed heavy emphasis on strengthening military organization in insurgent ranks. A regular army command was established as the "Supreme Command." Significantly, this information was for the first time revealed by Radio Peking in a broadcast of

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1 January 1969. The insurgent forces in north and northeast Thailand were renamed the "Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces" (TPLAF), organized to fight under the "Supreme Command." On 3 January Radio Peking took the unprecedented step of having a Chinese official's promise made public to provide "more powerful support to...the revolutionary people of Thailand."

Thereafter in 1969, the Chinese began to refer openly to another organizational improvement -- namely, to the CPT's leadership role of the insurgency. References to the useless political "fronts" (the TIM and TPF) were dropped from Peking media statements.

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Recruitment and organizational efforts were thereafter partly directed toward winning the support of the Meo people for the TPLAF.

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Beginning in early 1971, Chinese broadcasts reflected an apparently optimistic appraisal of the insurgency gains in the north and northeast. By late summer, the claims were that "relatively consolidated revolutionary base areas have been set up in certain regions in north Thailand." (NCNA article of 6 August 1971) The Doi Pha Chi camp was a consolidated base area.

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In the immediate future, it is highly unlikely that Peking will stop sponsoring the insurgency. If it were merely a matter of improving its international image for diplomatic reasons such support might cease. However, not only the clandestine VPT radio station but NCNA, in its own name, has denounced the "Thanom-Praphat clique," praised the outlawed CPT, and encouraged the TPLAF to fight on and grow in strength "under extremely difficult conditions." (NCNA commentary on the 8th anniversary of the insurgency, broadcast from Peking on 7 August 1972) Thus despite Chou En-lai's friendly welcome to the leader ("advisor") of the Thai table tennis delegation on 5 September 1972, government-to-government relations will be kept distinct from PRC support.

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
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While Mao lives, Peking probably will persist in sponsoring the CPT in the insurgency. At the same time, it will continue with its diplomacy, raising it to a higher level of official contact with Bangkok. This dual policy will require a clear-cut separation of insurgency-support from diplomacy, and Peking in October 1972 did just that by avoiding any mention of National Day greetings from the CPT. Nevertheless, the VPT still beams its broadcasts into Thailand from China to buoy up insurgent morale, to set propaganda themes for them, and to incite anti-Bangkok animosity in order to help them recruit followers.

The Thais have asked that the Chinese stop the VPT's subversive broadcasts. The response of the Chinese leaders has been most recently made clear by a broadcast stating, in effect, that the request will be denied. The broadcast, beamed from China, celebrated the 11th anniversary of the VPT, and went on to declare that

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The Thai people, under oppression by the US-Thanom clique, have as their propaganda weapon and their voice this VPT. They have been working together in the mobilization and morale-boosting of the forces...

No matter what methods, tricks, or how slanderous a propaganda campaign it resorts to, the bandit US-Thanom clique will never thwart and destroy the VPT.  
(VPT broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 1 March 1973) (emphasis supplied)

This deliberate Chinese rebuke to the Thai leaders is another indication that insurgency-support will continue despite the ceasefire in Vietnam.

The insurgency has shown significant concrete gains in the last two years. More PLA personnel may be sent in to be integrated into insurgent ranks. The number of insurgents in the north and northeast has been increasing each year. In September 1972, estimates put the figures at about 2,900 armed personnel in the north and about 2,000 in the northeast. Peking probably will support the expansion of these regular force units with even more Chinese-made armament, which may include new items, such as heavy machine guns, to supplement the weapons now coming into the north and northeast.

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## PEKING'S INSPIRATIONAL ROLE

The Philippines


Peking's support of the new, Maoist anti-government insurgency in the various Philippine islands is primarily in the form of political guidance and encouragement. However, there is good evidence of training and some funding of pro-Peking leftists over the years.

By far the most important, enduring, and substantive input from the Chinese Communists, however, is the mental hold they have over the young Filipino Communist, Jose Ma. Sison (aka Amado Guerro) who has strongly supported Peking on political issues and on the tactics for carrying out the insurgency. This commitment was made between mid-1966 and mid-1967, during his visits to China. Through Peking's guidance and influence, Sison has split off a young and more violence-oriented faction of Communists from the old Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and a less corrupted faction of insurgents from the old and degenerated Huk guerrilla movement. With this nucleus and with strong political support from Peking, Sison has implanted a new insurgency in northeastern Luzon (recently taking hold in other areas) which is more disciplined than the old Huk movement. He has directed the expansion of his political and military components along the lines prescribed by his "god," Mao Tse-tung. Sison stresses gradual expansion of "base areas," "quick-decision" warfare, "mass work," organizational discipline, and party control over the army ("the party controls the gun"). The Chinese seem to be satisfied that the commitment of this new leader to Mao's policies is so strong that he is as good as a CCP official in the field.

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## Philippines: Areas of Maoist Communist Insurgency \*



\*As reported by Philippine Security Officials

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The conversion of PKP-member Sison from his dedication to urban youth radical activities -- as leader of the ultra-left Patriotic Youth organization in Manila -- to dedication to Maoist rural armed insurgency was the result of a confluence of several events. First, he had been feuding with older PKP leaders at the time when Mao's Cultural Revolution erupted in China. Also at that time, the Chinese leaders were casting about for support from radicals in various non-Communist Asian countries where US forces were based and were being used to aid Vietnam war efforts. Finally, Mao's dispute with the Soviet leaders on an entire range of issues -- including the demands that foreign Communists condemn the CPSU openly and support Mao's obsession that "only" armed insurgency is the road to power for Communist parties -- was intensifying. Unlike the leaders of the old PKP, who avoided denouncing the US, remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and rejected rural insurgency, Sison adopted all of Mao's positions.

In the fall of 1966, Sison was far more willing than the PKP leadership to denounce the presence of US bases in the Philippines and to launch his youth activists into organized demonstrations against this presence. And he was willing to take on the PKP in an internecine fight to move it into the Chinese camp against the Soviets. He was strongly encouraged and influenced by the Chinese all along the way.

The Chinese role in Sison's conversion was spread out over a period of two years, 1966 and 1967. As in the Thailand case, Peking first began to encourage insurgent forces in Luzon -- the old Huk units -- when it became apparent to the Chinese leaders that President Marcos' administration had decided to cooperate with the US military effort in Vietnam. In February 1966, at the time when the Vietnam aid bill of Marcos was pending

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in Congress and was the center of a major dispute, Radio Peking broadcasts to the Philippines for the first time changed in nature, from avoidance of comment on Philippine internal matters to open encouragement of the insurgents. Broadcasts in Tagalog and Filipino to the islands drastically increased. Some Chinese leaders may have tried to keep this change from injuring the few contacts made with Philippine political figures on the diplomatic level.

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The Chinese apparently had not yet reached the point of encouraging a split in the old PKP, and in August 1966, they invited a PKP member, A.V. Hernandez, to Peking, where he spoke in praise of Mao, condemned "revisionism," and attacked the US on the Vietnam war. The Chinese clearly had begun to think in terms of punishment for the government when, in late 1966, Peking began to add "the Philippines" to Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia as Asian countries where armed struggle was developing.

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In 1967, Sison found more favor with Peking. He had become an officer in two radical organizations set up in the spring of 1967, and he became active in these in addition to retaining his post as chairman of the radical youth organization. More importantly, at a time when Peking was encouraging splits within old-line parties of the Communist movement, Sison held a position on the Secretariat Staff of the PKP. Sison feuded with PKP leaders from the fall of 1966 to the spring of 1967 -- that is, after his first visit to Peking and just before his second tour in China. The older PKP leaders insisted on remaining neutral rather than siding with Mao against the Soviet leaders, and because Sison could not impose his line (and for other reasons), he withdrew his small faction from the PKP in mid-April 1967.

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How much encouragement the Chinese gave Sison to split the PKP from within is not known, but he clearly was aware that Peking was encouraging splits within other neutral or pro-Soviet parties. In any case, the result of his deliberate internal opposition was the formation of a nucleus within the PKP for Peking to support. Peking took Sison on as the most promising of the young, violence-oriented Communists for the purpose of carrying out Mao's policy of making armed insurgency work.

Following this internal split and prior to the formation of a separate party, the Chinese hosted Sison for seven weeks, beginning with his entry into China in May 1967. As in 1966, he held discussions with officials of the liaison organ, the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, who almost certainly were briefed on the course of the internal PKP split. He was received by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 7 June.

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It was during this Chinese-sponsored visit that he became the carrier of Mao's policy for the Philippine insurgency.

In early May in Peking, Sison made his commitment clear in a strongly Maoist speech. He called for expulsion of the US from the islands, condemnation by the PKP of the CPSU, affirmation of "unity" with the CCP, and acceptance of the "success" of Mao's Cultural Revolution and of the superiority of Mao's doctrines. Sison declared "armed struggle" to be the PKP policy. He made an inspired defense of Mao's view that the "only" way to attain national power for Communists is "armed struggle," in the course of which the party must be entirely rebuilt and "rural bases" must be developed. (Reprinted in New Zealand's People's Voice, 10 May 1967) His early May speech in Peking was followed by an NCNA announcement on 21 May which reported that, in a letter to the CCP on 1 May, the PKP had pledged itself to a policy of "armed struggle."

This direct intervention by the Chinese into the factional dispute within the PKP aligned the CCP with Sison's faction; the CCP supported his faction and encouraged him in his opposition. The Chinese-inspired "PKP" pledge appeared as a formal "PKP" politburo statement, the text of which was broadcast in Tagalog to the Philippines. It declared war on the "revisionist" faction. Later in May, a Peking-directed propaganda campaign was unleashed, the broadcasts stressing Huk military operations and claiming that this was "a new development" toward armed insurgency in the Philippines revolution. On 29 May, for the first time, an NCNA article revealed that a Philippine People's Liberation Army "led by the PKP" was actively engaged in guerrilla warfare on Luzon. On the 30th, a People's Daily commentary spoke of final victory "if, armed

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with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, they fight a people's war, establish revolutionary base areas, and encircle the cities from the countryside." Chinese influence in the formulations was undeniable.

Owing to Mao's adamantly-pursued dispute with Moscow on ideological issues, the touting of the "PKP" at the time as a party dedicated to the doctrine of "armed struggle" was important. As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, there is a very special motivation for Peking's enduring support of armed insurgency -- something aside from the anti-US aspect. That motivation is Mao's obsession -- or compulsion (Khrushchev had described it as an "itch") -- to prove to himself and to others that his road to power is the best and "only" road for revolutionaries. This obsession is irrational, as there are examples of revolutionaries taking power by palace coups and by legal election processes. But it exists as a fundamental motivating force, imbuing an otherwise strongly pragmatic foreign policy with an encumbering dogma. As recently as 1 December 1972, the Chinese have again asserted that neither coups nor elections can supplant "armed struggle" as the only way to attain national power.

When it is expedient, for reasons of national interest, to disengage from insurgencies elsewhere in the world, the Chinese leader who desires such disengagement (Chou En-lai is the most important) must persuade Mao that a particular insurgency must not be openly supported by Peking. And Mao apparently will accept disengagement from some but not from all insurgencies Peking had been supporting. The Philippines case shows continuing political support and favor towards the man who is leading "armed struggle" in the islands.

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Within the following two years, that was roughly what Sison was successful in doing. Sison formed the new, pro-Chinese Philippine Communist Party-Marxist/Leninist (PKP-M/L) when, on 26 December 1968, he took his followers out of the old, neutral PKP, breaking with the old-line leader Pedro Taruc and his followers. As for the military arm of the new Party, Sison managed to acquire this component of his new organization through an alliance. "Commander Dante," a former old-line Huk, split with his Huk chief and joined Sison, and formed the New People's Army (NPA), the formation date being declared as 29 March 1969.

In line with what Peking at that time in 1969 was prescribing for insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia -- namely, that the party lead the army -- the NPA was made subordinate to the party, headed by Chairman of the Central Committee Sison.

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It is probable that Sison already has named a new NPA commander-in-chief. Corpus would be the most likely choice. In any case, the involved Chinese have made it clear that they want Sison's men to continue to repudiate "the roving-rebel ideology" of the old Huks. (NCNA article of 26 December 1971)

The insurgents seem to have been careful from the start to emplace themselves in secure areas. Within one year of its formation, the NPA had moved the area of its military operations from central Luzon -- the old bailiwick of the Huks -- to Isabela Province in northeast Luzon, where the presence of sympathizers (particularly the local governor) facilitated survival, and where the terrain (surrounding mountains) enabled Sison and "Dante" to expand their forces in relative security.

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The Maoist orientation of Sison and his insurgent allies is apparent in many aspects. Political methods and guerrilla tactics have been taken from Mao's writings by Sison, who has annoyed other leaders by reiterating the Chinese hero's ideas on guerrilla warfare incessantly. Sison disseminates these ideas throughout the PKP-M/L [REDACTED] and in the

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lectures he gives as Director of the party's School of Mao Tse-tung Thought (located near San Guillermo in central Isabela Province). As for more practical Maoist policies, the emphasis given to building political organizations from the grass roots and making base areas secure politically (as well as militarily) is apparent

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Encourage-  
ment and praise from Peking had come in the form of an NCNA broadcast of 24 August which noted that NPA "propaganda teams" had been active, that "militia" organizations had been established in some villages, that "despotic landlords" and "local tyrants" had been punished, and that Mao's ideas had been propagated among the "poor peasants."

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Yet another point of stress was on formation of militia forces, or self-defense corps, under the guise

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of what appeared to be legitimate associations called Barrio [i.e., village] Youth Organizations. This activity was intended to help mobilize for the NPA an entire community and place it on a virtual war footing "in defense of a barrio" against government forces. A similar course had been followed in Burma and Thailand. As for improving the military integrity of the NPA and the militia, [redacted] the existence of a Lin Piao Military Academy -- a special branch of Sison's School of Mao Tse-tung Thought. (No doubt the Academy's name has since been changed.) The NPA, according to an NCNA broadcast of 21 December 1971, has its own official newspaper (as the PKP-M/L has its own), and it is clear from what Peking media stressed that the NPA has been tasked with making political cadres out of its fighting men.

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Peking, for its part, transmitted via NCNA a 26 December 1970 statement of the PKP-M/L Central Committee which stated that the party adhered to Mao's "Thought" and was pursuing "to the end" the purge of the old "Lava revisionist renegade clique and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique" -- reference to the pro-Soviet Lava (arrested in 1964), Huk commander Sumulong (captured in September 1970 by Philippines security forces), and old-line PKP leader Taruc (killed in October 1970). Subsequent Peking-carried statements of the Philippine insurgents led by Sison strongly suggest that a dispute was waged within the old PKP over the wisdom of forming the NPA. An NPA statement of 29 March 1971 (carried by NCNA on 10 April 1971) declared that the "complete collapse" of the Taruc-Sumulong "gangster clique" in "less than two years after its mass criticism and repudiation" had "totally vindicated the correctness of the establishment of the NPA under a Communist party inspired by Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung Thought." (emphasis supplied) The old

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PKP in 1972 has shown some signs of being revived -- or temporarily propped up -- as it has tried to compete for support among urban intellectuals by engaging in acts of violence (bomb-planting and assassination). But it clearly is now the inferior Communist Party in numbers, morale, and appeal among youthful radicals.

As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, small advances in diplomacy did not curtail Peking's support for the Sison insurgents. When in mid-May 1971 two unofficial Philippine economic missions visited China and were received by Chou for a "friendly" conversation, Peking had already lumped President Marcos together with Ne Win in a Voice of the People of Burma (VPR) broadcast on 18 April which declared that these two leaders could not prevent the "doom of being overthrown by their own peoples." Following the economic missions' visits, NCNA cited a 21 May 1971 PKP-M/L newspaper article which praised the NPA exploits against the forces of the Philippine "reactionary government." And following the completion of the first major Philippine-PRC trade agreement in late August 1971, NCNA carried two news articles on the 26 August destruction of three government helicopters by the NPA.

Peking has carried reports indicating the areas of guerrilla activity and some of the Maoist military techniques being used. The insurgents were reported as operating not only in northeastern Luzon but also in other Luzon provinces, and in the Visayas and Mindanao. In February 1972, the insurgents claimed that

*Units of the NPA are now actively carrying out armed struggle in northern Luzon, central Luzon, southern Luzon, and the western*

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Visayas. In Mindanao, the party and the NPA have deployed cadres to train fighters from the poor peasants and oppressed national minorities to fight the landgrabbers and the reactionary armed forces. (NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by Radio Peking on 3 May 1972)

The PKP-M/L organ Ang Bayan claimed in late April 1972 that "regular fighters" have increased eight-fold since 1969 and that "mass" support has been extended to 18 provinces of Luzon and western Visayas. Ang Bayan also claimed that the NPA now has the capability "to launch tactical offensives within the strategic defense," 25X1 the meaning of "tactical offensives" [Redacted]

[Redacted] probably being quick-decision 25X1 ambush actions against government patrols of platoon size. (NCNA report of 29 April 1972) Sison's party organ on 9 September 1972 carried a completely Mao-oriented report on how NPA forces had been able to thwart the encirclement campaign of the Philippine army's "reactionary" troops. "The NPA concentrated its main forces while evading the enemy main forces and annihilated small and isolated enemy units." (NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by Radio Peking on 5 December 1972)

The Philippine insurgency has been expanding under Sison's control, even though its numbers are small.

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The main source of arms and ammunition for the NPA is internal, that is, equipment comes from combat captures, purchases from gun-traffickers, and weapons roundups (or collection drives) carried out in the islands. In order to conceal the sordid, covert nature of some acquisitions of weapons, the insurgents claim that they are using primarily the prescription -- a Maoist one -- of obtaining weapons from the enemy. Mao had said of China's civil war that "the enemy is our supply sergeant" -- a position now found convenient for Peking to paraphrase in connection with weapons-supplying of the NPA. Thus NCNA on 3 March 1972 made the following excerpts of a PKP-M/L newspaper article when discussing weapons acquisition:

*Confronted with the large-scale recruitment of commanders and fighters for the NPA, the party and the people's army are fulfilling their arms requirement primarily by relying on their own strength. The primary source of arms and military equipment for the people's army is the battlefield. More than 90 percent of the weapons of the people's army come from the enemy. Victories*

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*in ambushes and raids ensure arms  
and ammunition for the Red fighters.  
(emphasis supplied)*

Given the availability of smuggled guns and the practice of many radicals of acquiring and storing weapons in urban areas, the 90 percent figure probably exaggerates the proportion taken in combat. The newspaper article sensibly does not indicate the source of the other 10 percent of acquisitions.

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
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On the diplomatic level, Peking's policy can be expected to move toward rationality by small degrees. This would mean more people-to-people contacts and, eventually, some official contacts. For more than a year -- that is, since June 1971, and even several months earlier -- NCNA articles broadcast by Peking on developments in the Philippines have shown a diplomatic sensibleness in avoiding, for the most part, attacks on the Marcos administration by name. More recently, Peking was careful to use foreign press reports to imply its criticism of Marcos' declaration of martial law (22 September 1972), and this particular restraint has been maintained. This is in line with the low profile of insurgency-support that Peking has adopted in open media. Peking desires non-official relations now and official relations later with Manila. But not

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at the expense of ending all political support to the  
Sison forces.

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The Chinese will probably continue their broadcasting of reports on developments in the insurgency. On the one hand, Radio Peking broadcasts will probably continue to avoid direct attacks on the Marcos administration by name, using foreign press sources to relay such criticism. On the other hand, the VMR will probably be used, as it has been up until the present, to carry vituperative attacks on the Manila government. The Chinese do not operate a separate radio station for the Philippine insurgency; their policy has been to use the VMR. For example, on 9 September 1972, the VMR was used to broadcast to Malaysia and Singapore a statement from Sison's PKP-M/L which derided the government of President Marcos as a "puppet" regime of the U.S.

The dedication of Sison to Mao's revolutionary views marks him as the most fervent Mao-idolizer of all pro-Peking foreign Communist leaders. In practical terms, this means he is conducting himself obediently in the Sino-Soviet dispute in criticizing Moscow by name and expanding the Mao-model revolution in the islands. Thus in his letter to the CCP on the 50th

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anniversary of the Chinese party (July 1971), Sison personally disparaged the "Soviet Union" as "the center of modern revisionism." He was emphatic in dedicating his party to sustained learning from the Chinese model:

*The Communist Party of the Philippines emulates the CCP. It constantly strives to grasp the teachings of Chairman Mao. The living study and application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in Philippine conditions is today the main concern of the Communist Party of the Philippines. (Sison message published by NCNA, 10 July 1971)*

Sison spoke also of moving the insurgency into the stage of "socialist revolution," which is to be the final revolutionary stage before seizure of national power. Even the future form of the Communist state is to be the "people's democracy" of Mao's terminology. On 3 June 1972, an NCNA article declared the final goal of the Philippine insurgents led by the PKP-M/L to be such a Maoist "people's democracy." On 5 December 1972, an NCNA article praised the NPA for using Mao's tactics to destroy "reactionary" troops.


Sison is acting to win important non-Communist political support for his insurgency, and has dangled the bait of a share in a future revolutionary government to prospective allies.

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


Peking's two-level policy of diplomacy and insurgency-support probably will continue. As for Sison's policy, he probably will adhere to Mao's prescription for waging a protracted war, only gradually expanding party ranks, the NPA, and territorial holdings.

MalaysiaWest

Peking has the overall guiding role in the revived insurgency in northern West Malaysia (south of the Thai border). Its dominant influence is based on its control of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). This party is virtually an operational wing of the CCP, and in the late 1940s and early 1950s some top MCP officials held dual membership in the CCP and the MCP. Top MCP officials may still be controlled by such dual membership today. In addition to the organizational tie, the strong racial tie is very important in sustaining the subordination of the MCP and its insurgents to

### MALAYSIA: Areas of Communist Insurgency



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the parent Chinese party: most of the insurgent Communists are ethnic Chinese. Malaysia's Chinese school system has radical youth organizations which act as recruiting centers for the MCP, and recruiting in the countryside is also most effective among Chinese.

The MCP today shows none of the independence which marks a free, unsubordinated Communist party. It obediently adopts all CCP positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute without variation. It issues servile statements of tribute to the CCP and its leaders. For example, the 1 April 1972 MCP Central Committee letter of condolence on the death of CCP Politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih pledged to take Hsieh's revolutionary attitude "as a model of our learning." Moreover, from 24-27 May 1972 the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR) -- the Chinese-run covert radio station broadcasting from Changsha, Hunan in south-central China -- imposed on insurgents in the field a series of broadcasts carrying the complete text of Mao's Talks at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature (1942). Mainland cadres were subjected to the same study task on the 30th anniversary of Mao's Talks. The broadcasts implied that the MCP insurgents in the field were under the same CCP ideological and organizational discipline as mainland cadres.

The most important contribution Peking makes to the insurgency, is high-level guidance, indoctrination, and encouragement. There is abundant evidence that insurgents in the field use broadcasts of the VMR to set themes for indoctrination lectures. Many of the broadcasts used for political-toughening also carry detailed information on PRC developments through the broadcasting of articles in the Peking People's Daily and Red Flag. The organizing and political-toughening role of this radio station's broadcasts goes beyond mere revolutionary rhetoric and becomes practical aid.

Most of the insurgents in northern West Malaysia are Chinese, not Malays (who distrust Communist concepts), and some have been infiltrated from China. But most of them have been in the field since the end of the Emergency (1948-1960), when Malaysian security forces chased them into southern Thailand. Many new cadres have been recruited in the field and never have been to the mainland. Because of the difficult jungle terrain and the cooperation of the local inhabitants in West Malaysia -- mostly cooperation by local Chinese -- Malaysian security forces are encountering difficulties in counterinsurgency operations. Peking now seems to be determined to broaden the ranks of the MCP and its combat arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) so that more Malays are brought in. The insurgents are going about this kind of party-building in a gradual, deliberate way, but the resistance of the Malays to Communist appeals will continue to impede the pace of expansion.

Chinese support of the insurgency is maintained under a clear distinction between government and party relations. Like the situation existing between Peking on the one hand, and Rangoon, Bangkok, and Manila on the other hand, improvements in government relations do not carry with them a reduction or cessation of PRC support of the Communist insurgents. Mao is apparently unwilling to close down support, as was done in the period just after World War II by the Soviets and in the mid-1950s by the Chinese during the policy of Bandung-inspired peaceful coexistence. Ending of support was criticized as a "mistake" at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolution in August 1967 in Peking by a Malayan Communist leader, who is a client of the CCP. In a real sense, PRC support of the insurgency is a continuation of Mao's thinking during his Cultural Revolution regarding nearby guerrilla wars.

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The support, in contrast to the direct support given the Burma and Thailand insurgencies, does not include direct physical inputs, for obvious logistical reasons.

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The impetus for reviving the insurgency in West Malaysia came from Peking, and at the time of the peak of Mao's "anti-revisionist" Cultural Revolution, in mid-1967. By mid-1968, some 600 armed Communist insurgents, who had huddled in sanctuaries in southern Thailand where they had been chased in the late 1950s by Malaysian security forces, began to move gradually from inactive to active status under stimulation from Peking. They moved back across the border, first to reconnoiter and then permanently to position themselves in small base areas in northern West Malaysia. The CTs -- that is, Communist Terrorists or members of the MNLA -- numbered about 600 regular armed cadres

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at the close of the Emergency (1948-1960), expanded to about 1,000 by mid-1968, to about 1,600 in mid-1970, and to about 1,800 in mid-1972. The slow upward progression in the number of armed insurgents represents a positive gain, and the existence of small bases capable of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points toward a long-term potential expansion.

The kindling spark was presumably in the form of a secret directive during Mao's Cultural Revolution, but the public form of the spark came as an article written by a Chinese Communist client in Peking: a Malay Communist, P. V. Sarma, Chief of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL). The exhortations in the article, which was published in the MNLL's Mao-line journal in August 1967, in effect directed the Malayan Communists to get out of front activities in Malayan parliamentary politics and out of the southern Thailand sanctuaries, to take up their weapons, and to start organizing themselves for serious work: guerrilla warfare. It insisted that "armed struggle" was the only way to attain political power, that the MCP had made a serious "mistake" in abandoning armed struggle just after World War II, and that the situation was becoming favorable for a resumption of guerrilla warfare to be handled in a well-organized way.

The article of Sarma had considerable significance. The fact that this key article was written while the author was in Peking as the representative of the MNLL and that it contained Mao-type exhortations on the absolute need for "armed struggle" as the only road to power in Malaysia indicates that it represented a Chinese Communist initiative. Peking's ideological position that "armed struggle" should be the main form of struggle in Malaysia was affirmed in the formal MCP statement of 1 June 1968. Army-insurgent work would

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replace political-front work and "parliamentary" politics. The statement was another indication of MCP subordination to the parent Chinese party.

Thus the stage of beginning the armed struggle was reached in West Malaysia in June 1968. The same held true for the beginning of political agitation among the "masses":

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The course of insurgent military actions between 1968 and 1972 in the field demonstrates that Peking and its client, the MCP, were not engaged only in the rhetoric of revolution, but were also engaged in the real thing. That is, Peking's support was not merely token aid, not simulated aid of no real account. On the contrary, Peking's guidance, indoctrination, and encouragement activities were positive concrete acts designed to have the effect of reviving an insurgency and making sure that the revival did not die at its rebirth.

The Peking-inspired revival of the armed insurgency can be fixed to the date of 17 June 1968 when a force of the MNLA for the first time since the late 1950s attacked a Malaysian security force unit on Malaysian territory. This well-trained Communist force numbered about 40 armed and uniformed men, and their ambush was effectively carried out. The evidence is that the revival of the insurgency in mid-1968 reflected from the start considerable military competence: good planning, tactical caution, good execution.

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Their mission later became that of making selective attacks on Malaysian security force

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units and undertaking selective sabotage of key installations in West Malaysia. Toward the end of 1968, the number of MNLA -- or CT -- incursions from southern Thailand gradually increased. In late 1970, it was solidly confirmed that small groups of CT infiltrators had permanently established small bases for inside-Malaysia operations -- a development occurring for the first time since the late 1950s.

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The CTs were still building their units and were not in a phase of general offensive operations. But they did engage in selective strikes against government forces. A major incident involving the mining by CT forces of the main west coast road linking Malaysia and Thailand took place in late October 1969. On 10 December, a strategic installation was hit: a group of CTs blew up the 100-foot-long railway bridge on Malaysian territory about two miles southwest of Padang Besar, Perlis Province, severing for a few days the main railway link between Thailand and Malaysia. Gradually the CTs increased the number of cross-border incursions, their calculation having been to demonstrate their ability to operate on Malaysian territory without suffering excessive combat losses. They wanted to test their own ability to safely infiltrate, to hit important installations and roads, and to move bigger units across undetected. The planning was careful, the pace deliberate, and the actions generally low-risk.

Peking's role in the overall guidance of these developments is further suggested by its establishing, on PRC soil, the clandestine radio station -- the VMR -- at a time when CT units first began to be embedded across the southern Thailand border. Inaugurated on 15 November 1969, the radio station claimed to be the

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"Malayan people's own radio station." Actually, according to technical observations, the VMR broadcasts from a location near Changsha, in Yunnan Province in south-central China. The November broadcast declared that the VMR

*...will exert utmost efforts to propagate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and the policies of the MCP...it will prepare revolutionary public opinion for the launching of an extensive people's war in Malaya with the purpose of crushing imperialism, modern revisionism, and all reactionaries at home, and establishing a people's republic of Malaya. (emphasis supplied)*

In order to set forth "policies" and prepare "revolutionary" public opinion, the VMR has been broadcasting to Malaysia and Singapore 56 hours per week. On occasion, an entire week is devoted to one major subject. For example, from 4 to 10 October 1972, the VMR devoted its time exclusively to broadcasting the MCP's New Constitution.

Since the fall of 1970, Peking has been sanitizing Radio Peking replays of VMR broadcasts, editing out derogatory references to the Malaysian leaders by name. But this effort to improve the diplomatic image to foreign audiences has not changed the nature of the broadcasts of the VMR which are beamed into Malaysia and Singapore. These broadcasts continue to direct the insurgents to sustain their "armed struggle" in a protracted way against government forces.

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In order to increase the mass following of the MCP, the Chinese have decided to cross ethnic lines in setting forth their Communist appeals. It is a significant fact that PRC-directed VMR broadcasts are made in three languages -- Chinese, Malay, and Tamil -- with almost equal time to Malay and Chinese. Thus despite the fact that most pro-Communist elements in West Malaysia are Chinese, Peking is actively trying to make inroads among the Malays. The strong emphasis placed on influencing Malays toward the Communist insurgency reflects Peking's awareness that the guerrilla war cannot expand in a big way in actual territory seized without bringing in this dominant national group.

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Peking had been carrying out a policy of unity-of-all-nationalities in Burma and Thailand to expand insurgent ranks there. That a similar policy was operative in Malaysia is indicated by the new appeals to Malays in the field and in Peking-originated guidance. An example of such guidance is the VMR editorial of 29 April 1972, later carried by NCNA on 4 May in excerpt form, declaring that the MCP is the real representative of "all nationalities" of the country. For the most part, however, Malays (in contrast to the Chinese) have remained impervious to the influence of such Maoist indoctrination.

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Since the revival of the insurgency in 1968, Peking has been working to raise the determination of the fighters to persist in a protracted war. Morale-building broadcasts are exaggerating the losses of government units whenever a minor clash between Malaysian security forces and the MNLA in border areas occurs. For example, on 3 July 1970, NCNA, quoting the China-based radio station, VMR, claimed that the CTs' 12th Regiment had shot down a fighter-bomber and a helicopter and had damaged another helicopter. It also insisted that "the broad masses in the enemy-occupied areas are waging more extensive armed struggle in enthusiastic response to the call of the MCP."

The VMR continues to call for the "overthrow" of the government, to declare Mao's road to be the "only" one to attain power, and to remind MCP cadres that they "must" sustain their study of Mao's ideology. In a major editorial greeting the PRC's National Day, the VMR declared on 30 September 1972 that

Socialist China is an unshakable base area for the world revolution....

From their protracted revolutionary practice, the people of our country have fully realized that to overthrow an imperialist-colonialist rule and their puppets, we must rely only on arms but not on ballot boxes, as was pointed out in the important statement of the Central Committee of the MCP of 25 April 1972 ....

The Razak clique is shouting for the setting up of a national front, and the

Lee Kuan Yew clique has been staging its general elections comedy drama.... Their death-bed struggle cannot save them from their doom....

We must raise still higher the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought... (emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, the insurgents have been told "to fight to the end" against the "Razak clique." (VMR broadcast of 4 November 1972)

Separating diplomacy out from Peking's dual policy of diplomacy-insurgency has been the task of Chou En-lai, who skillfully accentuated the positive during the May 1971 visit of the Malaysian trade delegation to Peking. Stressing diplomacy, Chou seemed to accept Malaysia as one country: he was the first Chinese leader to drop the usage, "Malaya," which had implied Peking's insistence (since the formation of Malaysia as a Federation in 1963) that it was still unacceptable as a single new state. Chou tried to stay away from explicit and unequivocal statements regarding the insurgency half of Peking's policy toward Malaysia.

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Actually, Chou's acceptance of Malaysia as a single country was only a dialectical tactic, to use

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CCP language. Peking does not accept the existence of Malaysia. Chinese maps in 1965 did not show a federated Malaysia, but rather depicted Malaya as a separate country in the west and Sarawak and Sabah (i.e., most of North Borneo) as still under colonial rule in the east. Peking's new World Atlas, published in February 1972 by the PRC's Cartographic Institute and therefore representing the official view, continues this policy. It adheres to the pre-1963 name of "Malaya" on its map pages, and in the commentary accompanying the maps, the relevant section is called "Malaya." It also maintains ambiguity about whether Singapore is now an independent country or part of Malaya. Singapore is discussed under the "Malaya" section of the commentary, and on the map pages, it is divided from "Malaya" by a regional rather than an international boundary. More importantly, the commentary carries forward Peking's policy of supporting the insurgency, declaring in the "Malaya" section that "on 1 February 1949, a national liberation army was established under the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party; it actively began a people's armed struggle."

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[REDACTED] the VMR attacked "Razak and his ilk" (VMR broadcast of 28 August 1971). Similar attacks against the Malaysian leader have been continued by the Chinese-run clandestine radio.

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Keeping any improvement in diplomatic or trade relations as a separate matter, which will not effect support for the insurgency, Peking had its NCNA publish two articles, one on insurgency in West Malaysia and the other on terrorist actions in East Malaysia (North Borneo), using the PRC-based VMR as the source of the commentaries. There have been small steps toward improving relations. For example, a ping-pong delegation was sent to Peking in mid-August 1972, the PRC ambassador in Rangoon attended the Malaysian National Day reception there on 31 August, and PRC central media avoided any mention of greetings from the MCP during the 1 October National Day celebrations in Peking. Nevertheless, the Chinese have not disengaged from support of the insurgency.

Most recently, they again have refused to disavow support of the MCP-led insurgents. In the course of this refusal, Chinese officials showed subtlety in trying to equate the anti-Razak broadcasts with the non-subversive, non-hostile, and non-revolutionary practices of most Western countries in disseminating religious and political views abroad. They adopted the tactic of making analogies where, in fact, sharp contrasts exist. Their analogy-making procedure avoided all mention of the hostile nature of almost every VMR broadcast beamed into Malaysia which attack the domestic and foreign policies of Prime Minister Razak, as well as the Prime Minister personally as a "fascist

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dictator." More importantly, their procedure was an effort to conceal the revolutionary-subversive intent of the broadcasts -- namely, to provide guidance and to encourage the insurgents to do a professional job of expanding their armed units and the territory they hold.

Despite the fact that the only condition Malaysia placed on establishing relations with Peking was that the PRC renounce its support of the MCP, in late November 1972 such a promise was not given.

The Secretary General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US ambassador in Kuala Lumpur on 7 December 1972 that during his November talks with Chou, Chou reviewed the PRC position on the MCP in historical perspective, saying that China indeed supported the MCP in its struggle against British imperialism. PRC support continued today as a matter of ideology -- Chou depicted it as "akin to religion" -- to provide moral support for other socialist movements. Chou went on to say that this continued support should not be a matter of concern for Kuala Lumpur because China would limit such support to the propaganda level. China would not engage in direct support of subversion against the Malaysian government. Chou also said that he was sure that this problem could be arranged between the two countries in a mutually satisfactory way. It is possible that Chou was hinting at a deal whereby Kuala Lumpur would agree to recognize the PRC as the only government of China at the price of Peking ceasing its

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VMR broadcasts into Malaysia. It is more likely, however, that Chou's remark was intended to increase the optimism of Kuala Lumpur about an end to Chinese support in order to combat the retarding effect on improved relations of counsel given Razak by Djakarta, Bangkok, and Manila. This would mean a greater inclination in Kuala Lumpur to further improve relations without, beforehand, attaining a PRC promise to end insurgency-support.

In effect, as late as November 1972, Chinese officials explicitly refused to disavow support for wars of "national liberation," stating to Malaysian officials that support in the form of radio broadcasts and sympathy "would continue." This Chinese position was a direct rebuff to an explicit Malaysian request for an end to PRC insurgency-support.

The insurgents in Malaysia are not yet in a general offensive stage. They are intensively working mainly on establishing more bases and recruiting personnel. NCNA broadcasts (as well as the VMR) have noted this situation, reflecting an awareness in Peking that the MNLA still represents a small insurgency by contrast with the Malaysian security forces in northern West Malaysia. Possibly in the next year or two, the MNLA will resort to more offensive forays from base areas. Chinese political and radio propaganda support continues, and most likely will continue, at least until Mao dies.

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MalaysiaEast: North Borneo

Peking keeps its political support of the insurgency in West Malaysia separate from its support of the even smaller terrorist operations of Communists in "North Kalimantan" -- the name Peking uses for North Borneo, consisting of Sarawak and Sabah in East Malaysia. The Chinese leaders were forced to a decision in 1963 when "North Kalimantan" became part of the new Malaysia Federation: to accept the coalescence of the new Malaysia and encourage the Sarawak Communists to coalesce into one party with the MCP or to follow Sukarno's "confrontation" policy of opposing the union of "North Kalimantan" with Malaysia and thereby keeping the Sarawak Communists apart from the MCP. In deciding upon the latter course, the Chinese leaders in 1964 established in Peking a front, the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, led by Sarawak Communists. Peking media thereafter touted the small insurgency in broadcasts as a revolutionary "armed struggle" distinct from MCP operations. The Sarawak Communists, desiring independence from Indonesia as well as from Malaysia, have also kept clear of subordination to the Indonesian Communist Party.

Until recently, the Chinese have equivocated on the matter of the existence or non-existence of a separate, independent "North Kalimantan Communist Party."

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Sarawak Communist party had been established in January 1968 and that its party constitution exists as well as its covert apparatus. The Chinese now seem willing to recognize the party. Their Yunnan-based VMR during the period between 2 and 12 December 1972 for the first time referred to the "North Kalimantan Communist Party,"

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suggesting Peking's apparent view that the Sarawak insurgents are somewhat more unified than previously and should be encouraged further to tighten up their organization.

Chinese support of the North Kalimantan guerrillas -- the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO), a name used for convenience in referring to them -- consists of political guidance and encouragement. Ever since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the Chinese have housed and used various Sarawak Communist leaders and "front" leaders in Peking. The journal of the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, Liberation News, is printed in China. In the fall of 1965, when the Indonesian army began a large-scale annihilation of Communists and suspected Communists, remnants of the Sarawak guerrillas moved across the border into the nearby jungles of East Malaysia, and the Chinese supported their cause. But systematic political guidance and encouragement did not begin until the start of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

The new, systematic stage of Chinese guidance and encouragement began on 9 July 1966. On that day, a North Kalimantan client of the Chinese

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called for the guerrillas to

- (1) "take up arms" in order to attain "national liberation,"

- (2) "fully mobilize the masses of peasants" of various "nationalities" (rather than almost exclusively rallying local Chinese),
- (3) "unite" all the "classes and nationalities" that can be united,
- (4) "expose" the "reactionary" nature of the "ruling clique,"
- (5) "wage the people's war," and
- (6) "persist in self-reliance."

This Peking initiative was given additional force within one month. Another North Kalimantan client of the Chinese was used by them to make a declaration from Shanghai on 9 August 1966.

We must wage a people's war in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's strategy and tactics for guerrilla war. In particular, we must do mass work and rely on local armed units and militia.

The Chinese used these two men to fire the opening shot in order to revive the small insurgency. By means of such programmatic instructions, the Chinese helped move the insurgency into a new stage, stressing the serious matters of the need to work with the populace, of the need for increased discipline and political commitment, and of the need for military professionalism.

The North Kalimantan guerrillas began to indoctrinate their rank and file. Peking later stated that the North Kalimantan "People's Armed Forces" had "initiated a movement to study and apply, creatively, Chairman Mao's brilliant writings," especially those which insisted that real revolutionaries can win against the worst odds. (NCNA article of 28 December 1968) The guerrillas "study Mao Tsetung thought in the course of their war, use it to review and sum up the practice of their struggle, and raise their understanding steadily." (NCNA article of 2 November 1969) Thus despite the small size of the insurgency, the Chinese were determined to help the guerrillas discipline their ranks and deepen their political commitment so that the movement would not sputter and die.

Most of the weapons held by men in the field in this North Borneo mini-insurgency have been stolen, and there is no reliable evidence of outside sources of arms, ammunition, or other supplies. Their groups still are not big enough to combine into a guerrilla army which could mount a sustained insurgency. However, from 1971 to the spring of 1972 their numbers have increased from 500 to about 1,000. Peking broadcasts since 1969 have been stressing the need to gain support of minority nationalities. The SCO has made some progress in recruiting among the Ibans -- a non-Malay tribal group which, together with local Chinese, provides areas of sanctuary for the terrorists when hounded by Malaysian government security forces. They do not seem to have a disciplined political organization. They do not have an intensive military training program or permanent base areas, as do the CTs in West Malaysia. However, they are troublesome enough to have impelled Malaysian authorities to launch counterinsurgency operations against them, draining off some security forces from West Malaysia.

In recent years, both the VMR and Radio Peking have referred more and more to the North Kalimantan People's Armed Forces and have virtually dropped references to the front of the Sarawak Communists since 1969. As in the case of Burma, Thailand, and West Malaysia, great stress has been placed on building up contacts with "all" nationalities (rather than keeping the insurgency exclusively ethnic Chinese). But since permanent "base areas" apparently do not exist in Sarawak yet, such areas are not mentioned in broadcasts, although "mass work" reportedly has opened up some safe-havens among the "various nationalities." An NCNA article of 23 February 1972, which claimed that the People's Armed Forces have existed since 1965, discussed SCO areas of operations without claiming the establishment of "base areas" -- presumably a future target for the SCO. For the present, friendly zones were adequate.

*In the course of protracted revolutionary struggle, the People's Armed Forces have done mass work apart from fighting. Thus they have established close relations with the masses of people of various nationalities like those of fish to water. The commanders and combatants of the People's Forces frequently go to the areas of various nationalities to live and labor together with the local people. They give medical treatment to the sick, concern themselves with the well-being of the masses, and propagate revolutionary truth among them. Not a few of the people have rendered support and protection to the People's Armed Forces, disregarding their own safety and even sacrificing their own lives. Whenever the reactionary troops*

and police came to launch "envirclement and suppression" operations, the people passed on information to the People's Forces and rendered them all kinds of support so that they could know the enemy's movements and, using flexible tactics, attack the enemy.

The article claims that the insurgents are improving their military and political training, studying "people's war" doctrine -- Mao's, by implication -- in order to "enhance their combat capability." As for the goals of the "protracted" war, the article maintains Peking's ambiguity, saying only that the "revolution" in North Kalimantan should succeed but making no mention as to who is to be overthrown and whether it is independence that is to be attained.

The insurgents in Sarawak and farther south in the western portion of Borneo (Kalimantan) apparently are still avoiding use of the phrase, "Communist Party," to depict their organization. The ambiguity of whether they are a separate "Communist Party" in a separate country or part of the larger MCP is being sustained. The insurgents may have banded together in a new organization to improve their internal control structure.

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The Peking-run VMR continues to broadcast on developments in the insurgency in east Malaysia, and it is likely that these broadcasts as well as those of Radio Peking are monitored and utilized by the guerrillas.

As in other cases of Peking's support for insurgency in Southeast Asia, there is today a clash between insurgency-support and diplomatic-advance in PRC policy. On the one hand, Peking's propaganda implies that liberation or independence from the Malaysian Federation is a demand of Sarawak Communists, that that is what they are fighting for, and that that is what the Chinese leaders are supporting. On the other hand, for diplomacy purposes, Chou En-lai in May 1971 made reference to "Malaysia." This implied that Peking accepts the permanency and territorial integrity of the Federation as one state formed in 1963. This two-level policy of both insurgency-support and diplomacy shows no signs of ending.

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